Peering Into the Future by Looking Back: The Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Paradigms

Takashi Inoguchi[1]

University of Tokyo

Global politics may be characterized in three paradigms: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian. By Westphalian, I mean the conception of global politics with state sovereignty as its key concept. By Philadelphian, I mean global politics conceived on the key concept of popular sovereignty. By Anti-Utopian, I refer to global politics premised on the key concept

---

[1] An earlier version of this essay was presented at the session, "Approaching the Millennium: Fusion, Fission, and Dominance in International Relations," the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, March 17–21, 1998. (To be published in the *International Studies Review*; and subsequently to appear in Davis Bobrow, ed., *Approaching the Millennium: Fusion, Fission, and Dominance in International Relations*, to be published by Blackwell.) My earlier ideas relating to this essay were also presented at the Distinguished Visitor's Lecture at the Harvard Faculty Club, November 12, 1997, at the Social Science Research Council-sponsored conference on the promotion of American democracy, Washington, D.C., January 12–13, 1998, at the Third Pan European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting with the International Studies Association, Vienna, 16–19 September 1998 (Inoguchi forthcoming a), and at the Third German-Japanese Conference in International Relations, Tubingen, Germany, September 21–24, 1998. The essay constitutes part of the "Dialectics of World Order" project of which Hayward Alker, Tahir Amin, Thomas Biersteker, and I are members. I am grateful to Hayward Alker, Daniel Bell, Thomas Biersteker, Davis Bobrow, Richard Cooper, Kraus Dicker Wolf, Michael Doyle, Helga Haftendorn, Peter Hall, John Ikenberry, Akira Iriye, Stuart Kaufmann, Robert Keohane, Lam Peng Er, Lily L. H. Ling, Hanns Maull, George Modelski, Susan Pharr, Lucian Pye, Thomas Risse, Nobuo Shimotomai, Theda Skocpol, Eugene Skolnikoff, Akihiko Tanaka, Toshiro Tanaka, Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, and anonymous referees for their constructive comments on various earlier versions of this essay.

© 1999 International Studies Association
Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.

of loss of sovereignty. This essay articulates the three frameworks, referring to the leading works of Henry Kissinger, Francis Fukuyama, and Samuel Huntington. Then, in harmony with the geopolitical frameworks, I articulate the three geo-economic foundations and the geocultural networks that sustain and reinforce the three geopolitical frameworks. The representative works used for articulation and illustration are those of Alexander Gerschenkron, Robert Reich, and David Landes on the geo-economic foundations and those of Benedict Anderson, Benjamin Barber, and Robert Kaplan on the geocultural networks. On the basis of these paradigms, I attempt to portray the future around 2025 in a mixture of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian directions. The thrust of this conceptual essay is that of peering into the future by looking back (i.e., that of a more historical appreciation in understanding the future of global politics assisted by theoretical articulation of the issues).

The paradox of looking back is that it can lead to looking forward. Once we notice that a rivulet has quietly bubbled forth at point of time $t - n$, it becomes much easier to see how the stream is likely to grow by point of time $t + n$ because by then you have seen how the stream has been flowing for the period between $t - n$ and t.

One good example is the history of state sovereignty. According to the conventional view of international law during the Cold War period, it was the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that unleashed the modern period of state sovereignty, departing from the previous medieval pattern, in the case of Europe, of religious universality and political feudalism. Leaving aside the many other actors and entities that are best described as medieval, such as the Hanseatic League, the Italian city-states, the empires of central Europe, and the Vatican and whole religious sects, this conventional view has painted the world ever since as if sovereign states were virtually the sole actors in global politics.

The fact is that before and after the Treaty of Westphalia, the landscape of Europe did not change dramatically, as Stephen Krasner (1993) astutely argues and Hendrik Spruyt (1993) amply demonstrates. Only in the mid-nineteenth century did sovereign states come to occupy the central place in global politics, with territorially based nation-states born one after another within Europe (Germany and Italy) as well as in its periphery (the United States and Japan). Furthermore, the European sovereign states overflowed in colonialist empires worldwide during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Only during World War II and after did colonialism begin to relinquish its grip, unleashing a proliferation of sovereign states unprecedented in the history of humankind.

At the end of World War II, there were only fifty-one sovereign states in the world, mostly European states and white-settled former colonies. When the United Nations (UN) headquarters building in New York was designed in 1945, the architect projected that the building would eventually have to accommodate a maximum of 100 member states. By the mid-1960s, however, there were far more than 100, and by the mid-1990s, the figure had reached 185. Given this dramatic increase in the number of sovereign states and the conventional views of international law, it was not unnatural that global politics was essentially "inter-national" politics, that is, politics among nations (Morgenthau 1959). This is the Westphalian framework.

Yet while the number of sovereign states proliferated, at least two other streams of thought regarding global politics began to develop inconspicuously until quite recently: the Philadelphian and the Anti-Utopian. The Philadelphian is the framework that governed the United States from its independence until the Civil War in the mid-nineteenth century and that has been in the process of reviving on a global scale toward the end of the twentieth century. It is manifested in the dramatic increase in the number of liberal democracies that subscribe to the norms and rules of the free-market economy and democratic politics. One of the principles leading to this increase is that democracies rarely fight each other (Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). By Anti-Utopian, I refer to the framework that governs the failed and failing states and that has been structurally veiled by other frameworks. The term "Anti-Utopian" derives from the colonialist legacy. At the end of the twentieth century, the universalist forces that sought to "civilize" the world through territorial expansion in the colonial age shifted to international efforts aimed at global governance, human security, and humanitarian assistance. However noble these utopian objectives, however, what has resulted has mainly been prolonged strife, exploitative regimes shored up by international aid, and failed states.

The growing Philadelphian influence is evidenced by the number of sovereign states that adopt in their constitutions adherence to the conventions and declarations on freedom, democracy, equality, and human rights of 1776 (United States), 1789 (France), and 1945 (Japan). Its reach now extends to about 150 states. The growing influence of the Anti-Utopian framework is evidenced by the number of humanitarian-assistance and peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations that are occasioned by large-scale famine and by intermittent civil strife. In other words, while state sovereignty has become the Zeitgeist in the twentieth century, it has also been accompanied by the steady erosion of state sovereignty in the wake of globalization as well as the growth of the civil society (Biersteker and Weber 1996). These phenomena are behind the concomitant rise in the number of Philadelphian as well as Anti-Utopian actors. In other words, the three frameworks are growing in tandem (Inoguchi forthcoming b).

Indicative of the coexistence of the three legacies is the publication of three books on American foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, each of which frames American foreign policy in correspondence to the three legacies of the past. They are the works of Henry Kissinger (1994), Francis Fukuyama (1992), and Samuel Huntington (1995).

Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy* portrays a world in which balancing and bandwagoning are the key dicta of international relations. State sovereignty and the primacy of foreign policy are the two key themes. All other things are judged according to whether they facilitate the realization of adroit exercises in the balance of power (i.e., peace). His argument is that, as the U.S. hegemony going back to 1945 is bound to decline slowly, its international leadership must be augmented by intermittent acts of balancing by the United States. His central concern is with peace achieved by the finessing of balance-of-power politics among the major powers.

Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and The Last Man* advances the argument about the major consequences of the end of the Cold War, namely the disappearance of the countervailing ideology known as communism. This key thesis concerns the predominantly nonviolent mode of conflict resolution among those actors that share a common set of norms and values such as democracy and liberalism. Advocates of this theory interpret this to mean that by promoting democracy everywhere, the United States can lessen the likelihood of the outbreak of war. Presumably, there would be no reason to fight among states that have common values and political institutions. According to this passive approach, the United States is advised to limit its interaction with other states to liberal democracies. Contact with nondemocracies may deplete resources and is therefore to be avoided.

Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* focuses on regions of the world that are potentially resource-draining: the Islamic world and China. He argues that many civilizations are incompatible and that the world is rife with situations for their potential clash. His position is best summarized by the titles of his own articles. Although arguing that international primacy matters, Huntington does not state that Western values are universal. Rather than universal, he argues, the West is unique (Huntington, 1993, 1996). Huntington's primary perception is of the essential incompatibility of civilizations and of some sets of religion, race, language, geography and history.

In Kissinger's eyes, the Westphalian framework dies hard. Fukuyama sees the Philadelphian framework as resuscitated. Huntington finds the Anti-Utopian framework revived. Each are different. Yet, as a whole, they represent the three legacies under the standards of which American foreign policy is conducted. After all, the United States is one of the stingiest countries when it comes to limited transfer of state sovereignty to international organizations. The United States is a bigot Westphalian. At the same time, the United States preaches about

and acts on the principles of freedom, democracy, and human rights, irrespective of national borders. The United States is an innate Philadelphian. Futhermore, the United States relentlessly advances the notion and practice of the global market and global governance on the basis of the no-nonsense recognition of unbridgeable gaps between different religions, races, languages, and histories in terms of its own national interests. The United States is self-righteously and cool-headedly Anti-Utopian in this respect. Without overestimating the determining power of the United States in global politics, I would like to take a glimpse of future world scenarios through these three mutually competitive and what appear to be complementary glasses.

One can argue that this essay is excessively America-centric in the sense that the major works cited to develop my perspective on the future are most American and that such a study authored by a person from a different culture ought to be more cosmopolitan. Although not denying such a bias to a certain extent, I contend that the argument developed herein is based on my own critical reading and creative synthesis and that my more culturally critical and curious argument about future world scenarios (Inoguchi forthcoming b) may be fully developed only after this essay, which can set a kind of "global standard" (however biased it may be) parameter against more culturally critical and "esoteric" scenarios, is published.

One can argue that the representative authors of the three legacies are Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Hans Morgenthau (1959) for the Westphalian; Bruce Russett (1993), Daniel Deudeney (1996), Nicholas Onuf (1998), Michael Doyle (1997), and Robert Keohane (1984) for the Philadelphian; and Johan Galtung (1996), Immanel Wallerstein (1991), and Fred Dallmayr (1990) for the Anti-Utopian. (I have chosen these three out of three major considerations: their relatively recent publications dates, relative public impact in terms of the number of copies sold, and relative influence on American foreign policy during the post–Cold War era. (Cf. Walt 1998; Alker et al. 1998.)

Geopolitics, Geo-economics, and Geoculture of the Three Legacies

In order to characterize the three legacies of the past now vying with each other to frame global human activity, I distinguish three areas—namely geopolitics, geo-economics, and geoculture—and discuss them with reference to recent representative works belonging to each of the three legacies. I call them "geopolitical frameworks," "geo-economic foundations," and "geocultural networks," respectively (See Table 1).

Geopolitical Frameworks of the Three Legacies

In the Westphalian framework, the actors are "normal states," and the basic premise is state sovereignty. In the Philadelphian framework, the actors are

TABLE 1. Outline of Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian Legacies

Geopolitical framework	**Westphalian (state-centric)**	**Philadelphian (global republican)**	**Anti-Utopian (post postcolonial multicultural)**
Principal author	Kissinger	Fukuyama	Huntington
Key concept	State sovereignty	Popular sovereignty	Post–sovereignty loss of sovereignty
Institutional unit	Nation-state	Liberal democracy	Civilizational superstate & failed/failing state
Behavioral principle	Balancing/ bandwagoning	Binding/hiding	Fortifying, hollowing out/collapsing
Peace	Peace by war	Liberal democratic peace	Neither war nor peace
Democracy	Indifference	Aggressive export or opportunistic silence	Military intervention or cynical neglect
Geo-economic foundations			
Principal author	Gerschenkron	Reich	Landes
Key concept	National economy	Global market	Economic development
Driving force	State-led industrialization	Market-driven megacompetition	World cultures that guide the inner values and attitudes of a population
Critical variable	Large input of capital and labor	Critical input of technology	Invention and know-how
Geocultural networks			
Principal author	Anderson	Barber	Kaplan
Key media	State-run radio/TV	Cable TV network	Underground network
Key purpose	Nation building	Global penetration	Antistate reaction & dissident communication, reconstituting order in cultural sphere
Key effect	Video legitimization	Video globalization Homogenization	Subversive operations Legitimization of civilizational superstates

liberal democracies as politico-economic systems, and the basic premise is the ideology of liberal democracy. In the Anti-Utopian framework, the actors are failed and failing states, and the basic premise is loss of sovereignty. Normal states are characterized as having strong state sovereignty and by a clear distinction of order within versus anarchy without. They are especially sensitive to infringements of sovereignty and territoriality. They abhor interference in internal affairs (Biersteker and Weber 1996). Liberal democracies are characterized by firmly entrenched popular sovereignty and broad acceptance of universal norms and values such as the free market and democratic politics, however incompatible these two norms at times may be. They seek to downplay emphasis on protectionism and state sovereignty and the potentially volatile politics of marginalized segments of the globe. Failed and failing states are those that have suffered from "hollowing-out" in terms of sovereignty and have become economically marginalized. They are vulnerable in the face of global economic changes and security instability and prone to suffer from internal disorder and civil strife. They tend to be ripe for intervention from outside, whether it comes in the form of colonialism, humanitarian relief, armed aggression, or economic penetration and exploitation.

The behavior modalities of normal states are balancing and bandwagoning (Walt 1987; Schweller 1998). The aim of balancing is to contain the potentially explosive assertiveness of other normal states. Capability to fight must nevertheless be maintained in case it is necessary. In the case of an overwhelmingly powerful normal state (or coalition thereof), a state may resort to bandwagoning: if you cannot beat them, join them. The behavior modalities of liberal democracies are binding and hiding (Deudney 1996; Onuf 1998; Keane 1998). Like-minded actors band together in order to achieve a larger and stronger union. When faced with forces that might jeopardize liberal democratic norms at their foundation, however, concealment may be expedient. The behavioral modalities of failed and failing states are hollowing-out and collapse. They are actors that are no longer autonomous. They are associated with anarchy from within and intervention from without, yet they are so amorphous that their strength is not much affected by such outside intervention (IFRCRCS 1998; UNHCR 1998).

Why is it that these three influential works were all published at about the same time in the United States? I suggest that it is because the United States lives with the three frameworks. It is because, as a self-acknowledged world leader with a long-term concern about its sustainability and ambivalence over questions of isolationism and interventionism, the United States needs a grand guiding strategy in its relations with the rest of the world. One must acknowledge that the United States is the primary actor in global politics. Needless to say, one may argue no less forcefully that the United States is not a fully Westphalian state given its massive foreign debt. It is the only normal state on the globe in the

Westphalian sense, if Kenneth Waltz's category or "normal" state means possessing massive strategic nuclear forces and thus being able to determine its own destiny.

The United States is the founding father of Philadelphian actors, spearheading the economic liberalization and political democratization of the late twentieth century. It is virtually the only global actor equipped with the physical apparatus and mind-set for armed intervention. The primary responsibility for overseeing global developments on three fronts—geopolitical, geo-economic, and geocultural—falls on its shoulders. When the distribution of military power is characterized by the salience of a very powerful actor with the rest trailing far behind, it is natural for the United States to assume maintenance of strategic nuclear forces, conventional forces, low-intensity warfare, and satellite intelligence. When economic globalization accelerates and political and social liberalization gain momentum, there must be leadership to see to it that shared norms and values drive the global community to take concerted action to sustain peace and prosperity. When the marginalized segments of the global market become volatile and when the peripheral areas of the world become unstable, there needs to be leadership in doing something to alleviate the negative consequences that intermittently unfold in the failed and failing states. That leadership tends to be provided by the United States, depending on the predisposition of critics, a little too often, not often enough, or not quickly enough.

International organizations also live under the three frameworks. Take the United Nations as an example. The UN is embedded in the Westphalian framework in which member states reign supreme. It has neither the authority nor power to levy taxes or to conscript armies, two major features of state sovereignty. A carbon dioxide tax, or a taxation scheme that would secure an autonomous revenue source for the UN by taxing currency trading, has a long way to go. And a standby scheme for recruitment and dispatch for the UN peacekeeping operations has encountered difficulties. Nevertheless, the UN is increasingly Philadelphian in the sense that some 70 to 120 member states are characterized as liberal democracies, depending on one's definition of the term. The recently concluded treaty banning land mines was ratified by some 150 states primarily because nongovernmental organizations are most effective in disseminating information on an issue and persuading key member states to join in, including the country that hosted the conference, Canada. The three UN agencies that expanded their budgets, personnel, and overall activities in the 1990s were the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). They are most skillful and effective in appealing to world public opinion and mobilizing volunteers, funds, and other forms of support. They waved the flag of just causes (refugees, famine, and children) and excellent leaders, who all happen to be women: Sadako Ogata, Catherine Bertini, and Carol Bellamy.

No less important is the belief that the UN should be made available to the less privileged and more marginalized on the globe. It does extend a helping hand to those forced to live in the Anti-Utopian framework because member states are all supposed to be normal states (Westphalian), more or less, and to be committed, more or less, to a number of charters—including the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights—that enshrine freedom, human rights, equality, and democracy (Philadelphian). It is not coincidental that some 150 states have constitutions that contain some segments of these charters as well as some segments of the declarations issued in 1776 and 1789.

To illustrate further, using the case of Japan, one might note that Japan wants to be viewed as a liberal democracy and that most people, except for a few vehement nationalists, do not much mind the state of semi-sovereignty as far as national security is concerned. It is not so terrible to be a civilian power as long as it is assured peace and prosperity. Japan is often criticized as shirking its responsibilities as far as human rights and disarmament are concerned, which is to say, essentially, that it is not yet sufficiently Philadelphian. But Japan is like most others, not fully Philadelphian. And even a good Philadelphian actor often hides. Japan is also frequently criticized for not being a normal state. It is brought to task for neither having the will nor the capacity to resort to force even for the good cause of the peaceful settlement of a dispute, and because its political process is plagued with either too many heads or no head at all to assume ultimate political responsibility. In short, it is accused of not being quite Westphalian. But Japan has been trying to become less Westphalian in a number of respects in tandem with its growing economic interdependence and its inseparability from global security.

Geo-economic Foundations of the Three Legacies

The above three frameworks must be grounded in geo-economic bases as well as geocultural networks. The geo-economic bases of the three frameworks are described, respectively, in Alexander Gerschenkron's *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (1965), Robert Reich's *Work of Nations* (1991), and David Landes's *Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (1998). Gerschenkron's key concept is the national economy and the key actor is the sovereign state driven by its own late-coming status and economic backwardness. His protagonists are Russia and Germany. In the late twentieth-century context, however, he could have included the following three groups of states: First, the East Asian states in much the same way as he treated Germany and Russia in the earlier periods of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Second, the Nordic States with their social-democratic policy package. Third, the Napoleonic states with regard to regulation. The commonality of these groups is that they more or less uniformly stress the positive role of the state in bringing about economic prosperity and social stability. Some argue that globalization brings about weak and unstable nations incapable of responding to the demands of their citizens or of managing

their exposure to the hostile, volatile, and irrational international economy, and that the weakness and instability of these latter states will undermine even their economic efficiency (Wade 1991; Esping-Anderson 1985; Boyer 1990; Bienefeld 1996).

Reich's key concept is the global market and the key actor is an anonymous and amorphous set of all the speculators in the world, whose watchful eyes are on the lookout for opportunities to be exploited to the full. Summarizing Bienefeld's (1996) succinct critique of Reich's argument, leaving out Bienefeld's negative tone: the scenario of the future is the unilateral and inevitable movement toward further globalization. Reich's future is to be sustained by the fortunate few who can adapt to and excel in global megacompetition. His premise is that further liberalization will lead to globally higher income and more general happiness. Regarding the majority, who see a de facto decline in their income, he argues that it can be rescued through massive training schemes financed by the privileged minority. Government intervention, especially if it takes the form of protectionism, will necessarily reduce the general standard of living. The Reich world is the modernization theory writ large with the United States as the model for liberalization and globalization.

Landes's key concept is economic development, and the key actor is groups of entrepreneurs with the propensity to make best use of technological breakthrough. The driving force is supportive attitudes and norms of such entrepreneurs regarding innovation and enterprise in the cultural environment. The critical variable is therefore the cultural predisposition to advance invention and know-how in the context of economic development.

As for the difference between Reich and Landes, one can argue that both make much of the culture and of the importance of trust and solidarity. Yet I contend that Reich's trust is a far more generalized trust (Yamagishi 1998; Putnam 1993) than Landes's trust. Landes's trust is historically, geographically, and culturally far more nuanced and differentiated. This helps place Landes broadly in the same camp as Huntington and Kaplan.

Gerschenkron's transformative mechanism is the large input of capital and labor. The system of stockholding to collect capital, state-led industrialization to guide entrepreneurs, and long working hours in exchange for permanent employment status or high wages. As Paul Krugman (1993) correctly points out, a good deal of the East Asian miracle can be explained by the massive input of capital and labor.

The transformative mechanism of the Reich world is the straightforward input of technological innovation. As Paul Romer (1990) cogently argues, technology itself is endogenized in the market here, in contrast to that of the Gerschenkron view, where technology tends to be treated as exogenous. The global market began to flourish after telecommunications devices became available to all speculators and after opportunities for currency trading were

dramatically amplified by the Plaza accord of 1985. It will further flourish at some future time when telemanufacturing and teledistribution devices are invented and utilized globally.

Landes's transformative mechanism is Weberian. The inner values and attitudes that guide a population are depicted as fundamental to preparing, advancing, and sustaining economic development. Certain kinds of values and attitudes cherished by a population are more conducive to invention and innovation and to enterprise and development.

These three bases coexist in the late twentieth century. The Gerschenkron world still flourishes in East Asia despite the slight erosion of self-confidence owing to the Asian financial crisis, and starting in 1997; the Reich world is rapidly on the rise almost everywhere. The dramatic global spread of telecommunications technology and the instantaneous global financial services associated with that spread is the basis of this expansion. The Landes world tenaciously persists and is occasionally accentuated because the fundamental differences in the inner values and attitudes inculcated and inherited across cultures are more durable than the technologically driven cultural convergence thesis allows.

The Gerschenkron scheme corresponds roughly to the Kissinger world. The Reich scheme corresponds roughly to the Fukuyama world. The Landes scheme corresponds roughly to the Huntington world. Geopolitics has its geo-economic basis in each of the three frameworks.

Geocultural Networks of the Three Legacies

The three frameworks—Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian—have their own geocultural networks. These are depicted in the works of Benedict Anderson (1991), Benjamin Barber (1993), and Robert Kaplan (1998). Anderson portrays the state radio network of Indonesia in its primary role fixated on nation building. Barber describes the starkly different networking technology and strategy of the Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian worlds. They are symbolized by McWorld and Jihad, respectively. CNN and Samizdat (samoizdatel'stvo or self-publication) symbolize another aspect of the contrast between these two different networks. Kaplan focuses on networking techniques and the strategy of the Anti-Utopian worlds.

Networks are important in nurturing, cementing, sharing, and solidarity, and hence they are self-strengthening. The rise or decline of the three frameworks depends in part on how these three networks flourish, compete, or degenerate. In the Anderson network, the state and state-owned radio and television play the key networking roles.

As an example of how such networks are forged, I might note the example of Indonesia. Indonesia consists of some 17,000 islands and is a country where countless native, nearly mutually incomprehensible languages are spoken. When Indonesia became independent from the Netherlands, the new leaders chose for

the new nation's standard tongue a somewhat artificial and very local language spoken mostly in Malay peninsula coastal areas and their vicinities for commercial purposes. A Creole or pidgin form of Indonesian, it is a sort of Malayo-Polynesian Esperanto called Bahasa Indonesia. But the leaders chose this deliberately instead of Javanese, the predominant language of the island of Java where most of the Indonesian founding fathers originated. For the sake of the unity and solidarity of the Republic of Indonesia, it was decided not to impose a dominant language of the dominant population on all the rest. Efforts are made to disseminate the national language on all possible occasions through the public radio Radio Indonesia. Bahasa Indonesia is the symbol and device for nation building. Children begin to learn this language formally after they start primary school, and it is planned that this language will become the national lingua franca, rationalizing communication that transcends the linguistic diversity of the nation.

Networks in the region are also very important to Indonesia. A telling event was President Suharto's visit to Tokyo in 1993, at the time of the Group of Seven (G-7) summit, in order to present Indonesia's appeal to join the group. They asked straightforwardly and gave the impression that they really wanted to raise the status and prestige of Indonesia by joining the G-7. *Televisi Indonesia* approached me for an interview at that time, through a former student from 1990, when I had lectured on Japanese politics at the University of Gadjah Mada in Jogjakarta, as someone with experience in their country who presumably would have given me a certain understanding of their nation-building efforts. By inviting me to "video legitimize" their cause, they hoped to bring out a less harsh view thereof.

McWorld is the symbol of global penetration. CNN is its television networking counterpart. CNN is characterized by prompt global reporting on the spot with dramatic, well-calculated visual effects. Again, to draw from my own experience, I recall when I appeared on CNN with Diet member Wakako Hironaka at the time the Liberal Democratic Party was trounced in the June 1993 general elections. Everything was live, no script, no rehearsal. CNN Tokyo's Eileen O'Conner simply appeared shortly before broadcasting time and said that she would ask certain questions. The setting was also deliberately chosen: monitoring of the vote going on in the building of one of the Japanese television stations where CNN Tokyo has its offices. Against the background noise of the busy vote-monitoring room, we sat and discussed the general election and its impact on Japanese politics. Certainly it was calculated to give the strong visual impression that Japan was experiencing a dramatic change and that TV viewers were being made witnesses to it. This is perhaps what the United States government wanted to see in the context of the ongoing trade negotiations and in view of Japan's limited participation in the Gulf War of 1991.

Samizdat is the symbol of dissident communication from the old days of the Soviet regime. Today, fax and e-mail are the latest devices for dissident communication. They are used for underground or subversive operations or for clandestine intelligence activities. Back in 1989, I received a fax message some weeks after the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre, when anti-Chinese government demonstrations and meetings were taking place in Tokyo. The message was a call for solidarity from Chinese students at the University of Tokyo. I knew the name of one of the students, who had come to me a couple of years earlier with a letter of recommendation from Yan Jiaji, then director of the Institute of Political Science at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. I had known Yan through correspondence regarding the publication in Chinese of a book series on political science put out by the University of Tokyo Press, of which I was editor. In my introduction to the Chinese edition, I acknowledged the efforts of a number of colleagues including Yan Jiaji. The massacre took place before the Chinese translation started to come out, and when it appeared, in late 1990, my reference to Yan Jiaji had been deleted.

As suggested by the above anecdotes, the three frameworks display three different styles of networking corresponding to their distinct character.

Future Directions

Geo-economically, it is not entirely clear that globalization in its extreme will bring about peace and prosperity. If everything is subject to market forces, two obstacles may emerge. First, market turbulence causes instability. It can create the conditions in which market forces cannot function well. Second, the pursuit of market efficiency accelerates the marginalization of noncompetitive segments. The growing disparities that result from globalization and marginalization could easily bring about the conditions in which market forces cannot function well. Therefore globalization and integration are not likely to reinforce the Philadelphian trend in a unilateral direction. There are likely to be swings both ways, forward and backward. Atrophy of the Philadelphian framework may take place if the geo-economic foundations are not assured at an optimal level. Once globalization and liberalization reach the extreme, internal disparities may develop into something that cannot be easily contained. These could well precipitate internal strife and even chaos. The Anti-Utopian framework flourishes under such circumstances. In a similar vein, globalization and integration taken to the extreme may bring about a revival of state sovereignty because the state is counted on as the last resort against the relentless tide of market forces. State sovereignty under such circumstances could easily stress the symbolic and cultural aspects rather than the more conventionally Westphalian conception of territorial integrity, military might, and economic wealth.

Then the question will be: How deep will globalization be in the next quarter century or two. To get a clearer view of this situation, it is necessary to identify at

least the following three variables, which are likely to play major roles in determining the vicissitudes of the three geopolitical frameworks. They are: key technological innovations, deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions, and resilience of nation-states. Each of these variables will play a leading role in shaping the Westphalian, Philadelphian, and Anti-Utopian outcomes. It is my task here to see how these three factors play out their role in determining global politics.

Kondratieff, Schumpeter, and other business-cycle economists (Goldstein 1988; Saito 1998) enumerate the key technological innovations that bring about total factor productivity. Starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, these include canals (such as the Suez and Panama), railroads, electric power, automobiles, and information technologies. Each was the driving force in business prosperity roughly for the periods 1800–1848, 1848–1895, 1985–1941, 1941–1996, and 1996–, in this order. Canals and railways shortened distances dramatically between oceans and on continents. Electrical power provided the engines for industrialization. Automobiles are the exemplary symbols of manufacturing. Information technologies dramatically eased global communication and thus business transactions. What we observe now is the early explosion of technological innovation in the information technologies. Starting with telecommunications, computers, and financial services, innovation in this area has steadily begun to permeate the manufacturing and marketing sectors, bringing about new revolutions in business. It is not entirely clear whether these innovations will sustain the law of increase of marginal profit (Arthur 1994) in contrast to the law of decline of marginal profit, which is said to have been the case in the past with respect to the effects of new technologies. If that is the case, the claims for the advent of a new economy without business depressions might be credible (Weber 1997). If these things evolve sufficiently, it may be possible to sustain the geo-economic foundations of the Philadelphian framework reasonably well. Similarly, the geocultural networks sustaining the Philadelphian framework will develop further.

The deterioration of demographic-environmental conditions is the old Malthusian *problématique*. Technological optimists argue that biochemical and biomedical technologies will make breakthroughs to cope with the expected scenario. Environmental pessimists argue that, in view of the prospect of further population expansion and deterioration of the environment, the basis of food production as well as the fundamental conditions for clean air and water will be undermined, placing human life in jeopardy. Demographically, the proportion of the aged on the globe is becoming alarmingly large in comparison to the productive population in the advanced industrial democracies.

My sense is that discovery and scientific breakthrough will take time to bear fruit, and that all the splendid innovations in information technology that may be made in the next half century will not be much use in dramatically ameliorating the deterioration that takes place. Parts of the world population, such as thousands

of infants in civil-strife-torn areas, will be sacrificed. Yet the growing awareness of global citizenship and the increasing behest for global governance is likely to prevent miserable situations from further deterioration. Needless to say, all these are not likely to lead to any all-out Anti-Utopian scenario. But the lack of well-concerted action on this front will increase the likelihood of a doomsday scenario.

The resilience of nation-states will be sustained for the next half century. A whole world awash in the tide of globalization and driven everywhere by market forces is unlikely to take permanent root. That would ultimately mean the obliteration of most organized units other than markets, and this is highly unlikely. The more plausible picture is that the more globalized and the more market-force-driven, the more likely developmental forces are to resort to the state to restore stability and security and the more reliance there will be on national identity and solidarity as sources of meaning and fulfillment. Yet the traditional prerogatives of sovereign states (i.e., the ability to raise tax revenues and conscript soldiers) are becoming more difficult. As market liberalization and globalization further expand, these globally competitive firms rely less and less on the state. They find ways to pay relatively less tax by expanding offshore and seeking tax havens. Conscription is increasingly out of favor, and the raising of military reserves is based on volunteers. Internationally, mobilizing soldiers for peacekeeping and disaster relief operations will tend to be based on standby agreements.

I have already argued that these three directions seem to be *growing in tandem* from the outset. What kind of changes in the three directions certain distinctive scenarios will create is difficult to say. The three purely one-dimensional scenarios used in Table 2 are useful, but they do not say anything about a most or least

TABLE 2. Directions of Change in Terms of Three Key Variables

1. Key technological innovations Philadelphian direction	Information technologies steadily combined with manufacturing technologies, creating the conditions in which the law of increase of marginal profits would apply.
2. Demographic-environmental deterioration Anti-Utopian direction	Short-term deterioration and long-term stagnation without vigorous, concerted efforts to stem the tide, creating the conditions in which a self-contained North stagnates and an exploding and imploding South rocks the so-called Spaceship Earth.
3. Resilience of nation-states Westphalian direction	The state as the provider of identity, stability, and fulfillment, more symbolically and culturally than the more conventional Westphalian conception allows.

likely scenario. My best educated speculation is like a modal combination of the three purely one-dimensional scenarios. That is roughly as follows: global market forces will make definite advances because of the "Prometheus unbound" (technology), but their durable permeation will not be ensured because when it goes to the extreme, counterbalancing forces may offset the Philadelphian direction.

Yet, in an enlarged North of higher income, the Philadelphian framework will prevail more or less. In an exploding and imploding South, the Anti-Utopian direction and the Westphalian direction will be further enhanced. The Anti- Utopian direction will include the further emphasis on global governance that is more likely to work as the mixture of idealistic individual-centered humanism, the vigorous pursuit of global market integrity and consolidation by those globalists, and those cynical "civilizationists" who extend assistance to fend off the negative contamination of alien "civilizations." The Westphalian direction will focus more on the symbolic and cultural aspects of state sovereignty than the conventional Westphalian conception allows, thus creating a condition in which states will be more like "imagined communities," not in stages of nation building, but stages of nation fragmenting or weakening, under the growing forces of global markets and the threat of demographic and environmental deterioration.

If the above speculations make the future seem very near, it is important also to remind ourselves that a half a century is not so far away. The most important message of the above exercise is that looking back helps us to peer into the future perhaps more clearly because we can trace the tenuous yet critical threads all the way back, thus better understanding the path that has been trodden for much longer periods of time than conventional wisdom allows.

References

ALKER, HAYWARD, TAHIR AMIN, THOMAS BIERSTEKER, AND TAKASHI INOGUCHI. (1998) "How Should We Theorize Contemporary Macro-Encounters: In Terms of Superstates, World Orders, or Civilizations?" Paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meetings with the European Studies Association, Vienna, September 16–19, 1998.

ANDERSON, BENEDICT. (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. 2d edition. London: Verso.

ARTHUR, BRIAN. (1994) *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

BARBER, BENJAMIN. (1993) *Jihad vs. McWorld*. New York: Times Books.

BIENEFELD, MANFRED. (1996) "Is a Strong National Economy a Utopian Goal at the End of the Twentieth Century?" In *States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization*, edited by Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, pp. 415–440. London: Routledge.

BIERSTEKER, THOMAS AND CYNTHIA WEBER, EDS. (1996) *State Sovereignty as Social Contract*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BOYER, ROBERT. (1990) *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Columbia University Press.

DALLMAYR, FRED. (1990) *Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

DEUDNEY, DANIEL. (1996) "Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems." In *State Sovereignty as Social Contract*, edited by Biersteker and Weber, pp. 190–239.

DOYLE, MICHAEL. (1986) "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Politics Science Review*, **80**:1151–1169.

DOYLE, MICHAEL. (1997) *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism*. New York: Norton.

ESPING-ANDERSON, GÖSTA. (1985) *Politics against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

GALTUNG, JOHAN. (1996) *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

GERSCHENKRON, ALEXANDER. (1965) *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

GOLDSTEIN, JOSHUA. (1988) *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL. (1996) *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

IFRCRCS (INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CROSS SOCIETIES). (1998). *World Disasters Report 1997*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

INOGUCHI, TAKASHI. (forthcoming a) "Three Frameworks of American Foreign Policy Thinking and American Democracy Promotion in Pacific Asia." In *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies and Impacts*, edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

INOGUCHI, TAKASHI. (forthcoming b) "Three Japenese Scenarios for the Third Millennium." Paper presented at the conference on "The World We Are Entering 2000–2050." Schengen, Luxembourg, June 4–6, 1999.

KAPLAN, ROBERT. (1998) *The Ends of the Earth*. New York: Random House.

KEANE, JOHN. (1998) "The Philadelphian Model." In *The Changing Nature of Democracy*, edited by Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane, pp. 231–243. Tokyo and New York: United Nations University Press.

KISSINGER, HENRY. (1994) *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

KRASNER, STEPHEN. (1993) "Westphalia and All That." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, pp. 235–264. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

KRUGMAN, PAUL. (1993) The Myth of Asia's Miracle, *Foreign Affairs* **73** (November/December): 62–78.

LANDES, DAVID. (1998) *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*. New York: W. W. Norton.

MORGENTHAU, HANS. (1959) *Politics among Nations*. 2d enlarged ed. New York: Knopf.

ONUF, NICHOLAS GREENWOOD. (1998) *The Republican Legacy in International Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PUTNAM, ROBERT. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

REICH, ROBERT. (1991) *The Work of Nations*. New York: Knopf.

ROMER, PAUL. (1990) Endogenous Technical Charge. *Journal of Political Economy* **102**:71–102.

RUSSETT, BRUCE. (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

SAITO, SEIICHIRO. (1998) *Junen defure* (A decade of deflation). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.

SCHWELLER, RANDALL. (1998) New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition. *American Political Science Review* **91**(December 1997): 927–935.

SOROS, GEORGE. (1998) *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. New York: Perseus Books.

SPRUYT, HENDRIK. (1993) *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

UNHCR (UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES). (1998) *The State of the World's Refugees*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

WADE, ROBERT. (1991) *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

WALLERSTEIN, IMMANUEL. (1991). *Geopolotics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WALT, STEPHEN. (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

WALT, STEPHEN. (1998) International Relations: One World, Many Theories, *Foreign Policy* **110**(Spring): 29–46.

WALTZ, KENNETH. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

WEBER, STEVEN. (1997) The End of Business Cycles? *Foreign Affairs* **76** (July/August): 65–82.

YAMAGISHI, TOSHIO. (1998) *Shinrai no Kozo* [The structure of trust]. Toyko: Toyko Daigaku Shuppankai.